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## Towards a Durable Peace Strengthening the Truce in the Far East

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#### TOWARDS A DURABLE PEACE

#### IV. Strengthening the Truce in the Far East

Mr. President:

I shall complete, today, a series of four addresses to the Senate which I began on May 15. These remarks are directed to the broad question of reducing the pressures for conflict which, at several points in the world, push mankind perilously close to the disaster of war. I intend these remarks as an exploration of ways which may provide greater security for this nation and for freedom in a world that is more secure for all nations. In short, they are a search for a road to a more durable peace.

In previous speeches, I have dealt with two pressure-points of danger, in Europe and the Middle East. I have examined the realities in these regions, as I see them and, looking to an American initiative for peace, I have advanced ideas which, I believe, fit these realities.

In my remarks, today, I turn to a third pressure-point of danger, to the Far East. In the past, this region was a source of almost as much domestic political conflict as it still is of international conflict. But the years pass, Mr. President. It will do no good now to return to the issues, the statements, and the charges of the past decade. Our responsibility is to consider situations as they are today and as they possibly may be tomorrow.

A principal factor in consigning the recriminations of the past to history may well be that this Administration, like its predecessor, has discovered that there are limits to what this country can do, short of war, to influence a situation in a region as vast and complex as the Far East. It



may also have learned that there are times when it is in the best interests of the United States to do less rather than more. This may explain, perhaps, why the earlier, dimly remembered, policy of "waiting for the dust to settle" has been revived. Wrapped in an almost rigid official silence, it is this policy on the Far East which is being pursued by the Administration today.

Mr. President, I raise this matter, not to open old wounds, and I certainly do not raise it because I am an enemy of silence. I raise it only because if we are to move towards a more durable peace in the Far East we must examine beneath the silence. We must determine whether it is the circumstances in that region from which the silence is derived or whether it is because of policies laid down by us.

If the Far East were stable and peaceful that would explain this silence. If the interests of the United States in that region were secure and flourishing under this policy of "waiting for the dust to settle" then, nothing particular would be gained by stirring the dust.

But if the silence is fabricated from the events of the past, if it is fabricated from the fear of political repercussion and reprisal, then that is another matter. We must overcome this fear, if the nation's policies are in a box in the Far East and we do not know how to get out. If that is the case, it is time to break this strange and sterile silence. It is time to pry open the lid by putting to work the most powerful tool of freedom-- the lever of free discussion.

As I noted, Mr. President, the silence is understandable if there is stability and peace in the Far East and our interests in that region are well served by present policies. Can anyone contend, in all honesty, that such is actually the case?



Leaving aside the obvious violence which prevails in Indonesia, where is the stability in the Far East? Where is the peace? I have said it before and I say it again: What exists in the Far East is no peace at all; it is a truce, a tenuous truce. It is patched together largely by unenforceable cease-fire agreements with the Communists in Korea and Viet Nam, and by a tacit cease-fire in the Formosa Straits.

This truce is kept from falling apart by aid to other nations which runs at the rate of well over a billion dollars a year--funds of the people of the United States--and by billions more of their funds in direct military expenditures, to keep tens of thousands of Americans in an instant state of military readiness along the coast of Asia, from the 38th parallel in Korea to the southernmost tip of the continent.

To be sure, it is better to spend money than lives. To be sure, it is better to have men ready to fight than fighting. But is it better, Mr. President, is it better to pretend that this desperate paste-and-patch truce is peace, rather than to work for peace? Is it better, Mr. President, to suggest that this situation which puts a premium on official optimism and public ignorance of developments in the Far East while it absorbs billions of dollars of public funds, year after year, to hold together a quivering truce, serves the interest of the people of the United States?

The truth is, Mr. President, this truce, this tenuous truce can collapse at any time, no matter what we spend, no matter what we do to preserve it. No one can predict how it will collapse. What we can predict is that we shall either move from this unstable holding action towards a durable peace or, in a week, a month, a year or a decade, this situation will almost certainly burst in our faces.



At this time, Mr. President, there are three principal fuses set and burning in the Far East. There is one in Korea; another in Viet Nam; and a third in the Formosan area. These potential explosions are fueled from several sources. Certainly, they are supplied in part by the ideological struggle between Communist totalitarianism and freedom. Certainly they are supplied by great-power fears and interests which converge at these points-- the interests of the Soviet Union, the United States and China and, to an increasing extent, the interests of an emergent Japan.

Apart from these interests, however, there is another source of potential military conflict, perhaps the most dangerous in the Far East. That source, Mr. President, lies in the pressures arising from basic and still unsolved problems within the three areas. In Korea and Viet Nam, it is the problem of unification and the achievement of full and self-supporting national independence. In Formosa, it is the pressure of the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War and the pressure of the unsettled legal status of Formosa.

The urge to unification and full independence in Viet Nam and, perhaps, even more, in Korea, is persistent and impatient. It has existed among the peoples of these countries for a long time. This urge will continue to feed the pressure for war until there is some promise of progress towards its fulfillment. Unless this beginning is made there will be no reasonable assurance of a durable peace in either Korea or Viet Nam.

Similarly, Mr. President, neither side in the Chinese Civil War has really accepted, as a final settlement, the unwritten cease-fire in the Formosan Straits. This cease-fire leaves 600 million people on the mainland under the control of Peking communism and 10 million on the island of Formosa



under the control of the Chinese National Government. Complicating this question, moreover, is the dangling legal status of Formosa. Is Formosa a province of China, as both Chinese groups claim, or is it something else? Until some way is found to deal peacefully with these questions there will be no reasonable assurance of a durable peace in the Far East, regardless of what we spend to preserve the truce, regardless of the state of our own military alertness in that region.

Each of these situations, Korea, Viet Nam and Formosa contains a danger of war, which is not now adequately controlled. That danger is the danger of an unpredictable, compulsive act, a mad resort to military action for unity in Korea and Viet Nam, and for a final settlement of the Formosan issue. Should local military action break out at any of these points, it is almost inevitable that the great powers--enmeshed as they are, in the tensions of conflicting national interests and ideological fears--it is almost inevitable that they will be drawn into the maelstrom.

We may well ask ourselves: who will gain if war is unleashed in the Far East? Certainly not the people of Korea or Viet Nam. They have already seen the fruits of a pursuit of the goal of unification and full independence by war. They have seen it in mangled cities and villages and in millions killed, injured and made homeless. They have seen it in the freezing death of war in the Korean mountains and in the rotting death of war in the jungles and rice fields of Indo-China.

Certainly, this country will not gain nor will the Chinese people. We suffered tens of thousands of casualties in Korea; the Chinese many times more. Will the Russians gain? Yes, they might if they could stay clear of

it. But because they escaped the bloody consequences of a Korean conflict once does not mean that they will escape unscathed again.

Will freedom gain from a war of unification in Korea or Viet Nam? Indeed, will totalitarianism? These words will echo with a hollow, meaningless sound, if they echo through the silent smoldering vestiges of a world in ruins.

The fact is that neither national nor ideological gain can be expected by anyone from a renewal of conflict in the Far East. The fact is that a military solution of the present problems of the Far East is no solution at all. Because it is not, however, does not preclude it from being attempted. On the contrary, unless we begin to face the question of unification of Korea and Viet Nam by peaceful means, unless a beginning is made in dealing with the Formosan question, a conflict is, as I have noted, very likely to come--not only to Koreans, Vietnamese and Chinese, but to Americans, Russians and Japanese as well.

What we must ask ourselves, Mr. President, is whether there is some way in which this conflict can be prevented? Is there some way in which we can move away from the edge of the abyss towards greater stability in the Far East? Is there room for an American initiative for a more durable peace in the Far East?

In seeking answers to these questions, let me deal first with the divided countries of Korea and Viet Nam. While the problem has unique characteristics in each country, in substance, it is the same in both. Korea and Viet Nam have both emerged from a dependent colonial status since World War II. Both have moved part of the way towards a unified, self-supporting national existence. They are, as the Senate knows, however, still divided



countries, with the northern halves held by communist-oriented peoples and the southern halves governed by non-communist nationalists, closely associated with this nation. Each segment is still dependent on outside assistance for its survival.

The differences run deep between the communist and free sections of Korea and Viet Nam. In one respect, however, there is a similarity in the words which emanate from north of the 38th parallel in Korea and south of it and from north and south of the 17th parallel in Viet Nam. Koreans and Vietnamese, communists and nationalists alike, preach unification. Both preach full independence. The same theme echoes, too, from Moscow, Washington and even Peking.

I am aware, Mr. President, that the communists do not necessarily mean the same thing as we do when they use the same words. It does not follow, however, that the Korean people whether they are under communist or nationalist control do not speak the same language. Nor does it mean that the Vietnamese people, regardless of who controls them, do not speak the same language. Koreans and Vietnamese both have a very good idea of what unity means and what full independence means. They want both, and any policy which seeks to build peace cannot ignore the fact that they want both.

There have been attempts in the past to achieve peaceful unification in Korea and Viet Nam and they have failed. It does not follow, however, that we have exhausted the possibilities of peaceful solution. To contend that it is impossible to bring about unification by peaceful means is to argue the inevitability of a war of unification, a war which as I have noted, in present circumstances, will probably engulf the world and will benefit no nation, least of all Korea and Viet Nam.



That other alternative exists to peaceful unification or a war of unification? The perpetuation of the present division of these two countries? The experience of history suggests that, even if desirable, this course is not likely to be possible. Even if it were possible it would, at best, mean only partial independence for the peoples of these divided countries. The different zones would continue to be, as they are now, dependent for assistance on other countries.

For the United States, that situation would involve an interminable subsidy of the free zones in Korea and Viet Nam or, if we grew tired of that burden, a willingness to permit these regions to turn elsewhere for aid. We may well ask, to whom? To Japan? To Soviet Russia? To China?

There is only one path, Mr. President, in these circumstances which seems to me to make sense in terms of the interest of the people of Korea and Viet Nam and in terms of the interests of the people of the United States. Let us do our best to hold the tenuous truce which we are now holding but let us at the same time pursue incessantly by peaceful means, the unity and full independence of Korea and Viet Nam. I hope that this Administration is not so discouraged by past failures to bring about this development that it is prepared to throw up its hands in futility. I hope that it is not resigned to taking the easy out of holding the present truce in perpetuity while the propaganda war and the aid-programs go on. That is no out at all. It is a costly exercise in sound and fury which produces little if any constructive results.

If there is a way out in Korea and Viet Nam, the first essential is to free ourselves from the entrapment of the misused and overused words of the propaganda war. I need hardly add that others need to do the same.



The situation in Korea and Viet Nam has been blamed by us on the communists. They have, in turn, attributed it to us. And each side within each country brands the other with the failure to achieve unity and full independence.

The words have flown so thick and fast, in the past, Mr. President, that they may have blotted out the one possible road to peace in Korea and Viet Nam. It seems to me that, in the eagerness for verbal recrimination, one source of the problem of division in these two countries goes virtually unmentioned. Nevertheless, it may be more significant than the conspiracies of the Russians, the aggressive arrogance of a Communist China or the inertia of our own policies.

I refer, Mr. President, to the fears and rivalries of the Korean and Vietnamese political leaders and parties on both sides of the dividing lines. These are not new fears and rivalries; their ancestry is traceable to the circumstances of the earliest unsuccessful uprisings, decades ago, against Japan in Korea and France in Viet Nam. There is not the time to go into that history now but those who were involved in it, those who are still active in the political life of Korea and Viet Nam, both Communists and Nationalists, will remember it well. Sufficient to say that in the years since the end of World War I, these fears have grown deeper, the rivalries more bitter, at least among the older leaders.

The North Korean communists may shout that only the presence of United Nations forces in the south stands in the way of peaceful unification, as they boast, at the same time, of the present Chinese communist withdrawal beyond the Yalu; but they know better. The South Korean nationalists may point out that they are for free elections to unify the country, and that



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all that stands in the way of peaceful unification is the refusal of the northern communists to accept this impartial device; but they know better. A similar situation may prevail in reverse in Viet Nam; and the leaders there, too, know better. They know that these and similar contentions, however effective in the war of words, will not bring unity and full independence, in peace, any closer at this time.

The truth, I believe, Mr. President, is that the political leadership on both sides in these divided countries is unprepared in present circumstances to accept any peaceful solution or even a means of peaceful solution which would endanger their dominant position, at least in the region in which it now prevails. And I may add, in present circumstances, who can blame them?

For what is involved in Korea and Viet Nam is not a gentle game of politics in which the losers come back to win another day. What is involved is a life and death political struggle among those who wield or aspire to power. It is<sup>a</sup> struggle fought not only, or principally, with ballots but with bullets and the threat of bullets. The losers do not come back to try again. They are made to disappear via the concentration camps, the assassin or the firing squad.

In all realism, we must ask: can an active nationalist walk the streets unmolested in any city in communist North Korea or communist North Viet Nam at this time? Equally, in all honesty, we must ask: can an active communist walk the streets in safety in any city in South Korea or South Viet Nam at this time? The answer, of course, is that they cannot. Yet these are the principal political groupings which must live together in a peaceful, unified Korea and Viet Nam.



Similarly, there are opposing military forces in the north and south zones of the two countries, hundreds of thousands of men responsive to different political commands, to communist and nationalist commands. These are men trained to use weapons and to kill their racial kin of different ideological outlook across the borders. How are these armies to be unified? Is this a problem which can be solved peacefully in Korea by withdrawal of the Chinese forces or the United Nations command at this time? Indeed, is it a problem that can be solved peacefully by free elections at this time? To be sure, withdrawal of all foreign troops is a desirable goal in a unified fully independent and secure Korea and Viet Nam. But what will withdrawing foreign troops contribute at the present time to achieving this state of affairs? To be sure, a free election is a necessary device of responsible government but it cannot work miracles. What immediate relevance does it have when losers of free elections face death or other types of consignment to oblivion?

I believe, Mr. President, that if we examine the problems of unification of Korea and Viet Nam with an ounce of objectivity, we are compelled to the conclusion that neither the communist sides nor the nationalist sides in these divided countries have yet put forward a proposal which will permit the divisions to be closed in peace. We are compelled to the conclusion that no proposal which assumes that the groundwork for unification already exists has validity in present circumstances.

Yet, Mr. President, as I noted earlier in my remarks, the tenuous truce in Viet Nam and Korea may well give way to direct military action unless progress towards peaceful unity soon begins. I do not know whether a

start in that direction can be made at all. It seems to me, however, that if there is any prospect for one, it lies in the gradual breakdown of the rigid social, economic, and political separations which divide what is one people into two, along the 38th and 17th parallels in Korea and Viet Nam, respectively. This gradual breakdown, moreover, must come before rather than after actual unification takes place.

Both sides have long professed their desire for peaceful unification. Perhaps, the time is approaching to put these professions to a test. Perhaps the time has come for the United States, as an initiative for peace, to advocate a gradual restoration, first, of social intercourse between the zones of the divided countries. If intentions are, in truth, peaceful, those who control the zones will permit families and friends long separated to be reunited. If there is fear of espionage and subversion, then let the exchange across the parallels take place at first under the close supervision of the powers that be in each zone. The important point, however, is that they begin.

It seems to me, too, that the time is ripe for this country to advocate to all Koreans and to all Vietnamese the gradual restoration of economic relations between the zones. As it is now, the unnatural divisions make it virtually impossible for either part of either country to become adequately self-supporting.

I believe that these basic steps towards unity must be undertaken by Koreans and by Vietnamese, not by Chinese, Russians or Americans, on their behalf. It is the Koreans and the Vietnamese who will have to learn to live and to work together once again, not outsiders. If they can reestablish a



groundwork of social and economic intercourse amongst themselves, perhaps, in time, they shall work out a common political structure for the whole of their respective countries. If they cannot find common ground in these simpler matters, however, it is pointless to contend that peaceful unification can occur in a single stroke, whether it be by the device of foreign troop withdrawal or, in truth, by the instrumentality of free elections at this time.

While the primary impetus for progress towards unification along the lines I have suggested obviously must come from the Koreans and Vietnamese themselves, nevertheless, there is a role for the great powers whose interests and fears converge on Korea and Viet Nam. If peace is sought in good faith, then these two small nations will cease to be made pawns in the word war of the great powers. On the contrary, they will be given every encouragement by both sides to work out the complex problems of unification gradually and in peace. If and when these problems do begin to yield to solution, it will be time to consider troop withdrawal, free elections, and guaranties of the security of these countries.

Mr. President, I know that the course I have been suggesting here offers no spectacular remedy for the problem of the division of Korea and Viet Nam. It is, at best, a slow and difficult course and promises no certain success. Yet, I must ask, what is the alternative? For the United States, the alternative as I see it is to continue indefinitely as we are, to go on pouring millions upon millions of dollars a year into Viet Nam and Korea merely to hold a situation of neither war nor peace, a situation which is very likely in any event to give way sooner or later to war. For the



Russians and the Chinese the prospect is not much different even though for them, I am sure, it is probably less costly.

If there are sound reasons for not taking an initiative for peace along the lines I have suggested--and there may well be--by all means let us not take it. By the same token, however, let us lift the curtain of silence on Far Eastern policy long enough to let the American people and the world hear those reasons. Let us not delude ourselves with the belief that what we now have is peace in Korea and Viet Nam. And let us not delude ourselves with the belief that we are going to get peaceful unification and full independence in these countries by the policies we are now pursuing.

I turn now, Mr. President, to the problem of the Formosan situation, the third major threat to peace in the Far East. It is, perhaps, the most complex of all the problems of building a more durable peace which confronts this nation at the present time. I am frank to admit, Mr. President, that I see little hope of its solution. Yet, the problem must be explored if we mean to have peace.

I believe the difficulty stems in part from the fact that oddly enough, the Chinese communists and the Chinese nationalists are in agreement on one point. Both regard Formosa as an integral part of China. As such it becomes inseparable from the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War. For the communists, it is the one remaining area of China--outside of Hongkong and Macao--over which they have not yet extended their sway. For the nationalists, it is the one free province remaining in China; it is a base from which they hope eventually to liberate the mainland and the almost 600 million people now under communist control.



I cannot see, Mr. President, how this nation can accept the doctrine that Formosa is a province of China at this time. It is true, that the great majority of Formosans are racially derived from China. It is true that the return of Formosa to China was foreseen in the Cairo Declaration of 1943. These and similar facts tend to support the claims of the Chinese communists and the nationalists.

It is also true, however, that for fifty years the Formosan Chinese were cut off from the mainland and developed a different type of Chinese culture, heavily influenced by Japan and by indigenous factors. It is also true that the Cairo Declaration presumed the existence of a unified and peaceful China to which Formosa would be returned and that China has not materialized. It is also true that the Japanese Peace Treaty did not provide for the return of Formosa to China although it did provide for the relinquishment of Japanese sovereignty over the Island.

Mr. President, I am not a lawyer. I do not question the Chinese view--communist and nationalist--of Formosa as a province of China on the basis of law although there is no reason to assume that it cannot be so questioned. I question it first, on the ground of elementary justice to the people of Formosa. They had nothing to do with the Chinese Civil War and I can see no justification in subjecting them to the bloodbath which may still ensue as a result of that conflict.

I question the Chinese view, too, on the grounds of the security rights of the United States with respect to Formosa. An aggression was staged against this nation, in part, from that Island, and I believe even the communists are not so blinded by their propaganda as to deny that the

sacrifices of Americans in World War II had something to do--to say the least--with the defeat of that aggression. If the Russians have a right to secure their border against a repetition of the invasion which they suffered in World War II, I presume we have a similar right to forestall a repetition of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

I think we have made it clear, but if necessary, let us make it clearer: we seek no territorial aggrandizement in Formosa. What we do seek, what we have every right to seek, is reasonable assurance that it shall not again become a base of hostile action against us. We do not have that assurance if we accept the Chinese premise that Formosa is already a part of China.

I do not accept, the Chinese premise, finally, Mr. President, because to concede that Formosa is a part of China is to concede that it may legitimately be fought over by Chinese communists and nationalists in pursuit of the unfinished Civil War. In present circumstances to permit the extension of that war to the Island would obviously constitute the gravest possible danger to world peace.

I know that we cannot impose acceptance of the principle of neutralization of Formosa on either the Chinese Communists or the Chinese Nationalists. We can only hope that in their own interests and in the interests of the world they will see its validity. Certainly the degree with which they do see it and act accordingly should affect our own policies on the numerous other issues which arise in connection with our relations to China.



Mr. President, I have not included in my remarks today any comment on developments in Japan and the serious difficulties in Indonesia. I have not overlooked these matters and, in omitting them, I do not mean to suggest that they lack relevance. If we are to move away from the abyss, however, it seems to me essential that we look first at the points of most imminent danger and concentrate our efforts on reducing this danger. It is at these points, Viet Nam, Korea and Formosa, that we shall either begin to build a durable peace or face, sooner or later, the virtual certainty of war in the Far East.

Mr. President, in the series of four statements which I have just concluded I have been trying to answer a question which has been on the minds of many people in this country and throughout the world for a long time. The question, Mr. President, is simply whether or not there is some way to get out of the drift towards war, some road towards a greater stability in the world, some room for a sensible American initiative for peace.

In these statements, I have tried to isolate the principal points of danger in the international scene, as I see them, in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. I have sought to analyse the sources of danger to peace at these points. I have examined the policies which we are pursuing in dealing with them. Throughout these addresses, I have suggested ideas which might point the way to an American initiative for peace, not to a peace at any price, but to a rational peace with which decent people in this country, in the Soviet Union, in all countries can live.

Whether anything will come of these ideas, I do not know. The recent incidents in Latin America, the grave developments in France and in



Lebanon demand the immediate attention of those who are charged with responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign policy. That is nothing new. It has been the pattern of our conduct of foreign policy for several years. As it is now, our policies, for the most part, do not shape events; they are shaped by events. We are forever in pursuit of the last step on the last car of a train that is always pulling away from us. We move from crisis to crisis in international relations. We cling to old policies, to old ways, in a kind of fearful or unconcerned or optimistic inertia until these policies are wrenched from their moorings by an international storm, in Latin America or the Middle East or somewhere else. Then there is a wild scuttling about, with vast wastes of energy and resources, in a desperate effort to locate new moorings.

One of the reasons for these remarks was the hope that we might begin, as we must at some point, to get on top of developments instead of trailing them. I hope occasionally that we may be able to anticipate them in time to deal with them constructively.

I do not know, Mr. President, whether or not we shall find, in any circumstances, the durable peace which this country requires, which the world requires. Peace depends on many nations, on many factors. I doubt, however, that we shall find it, even in the best of circumstances, if we go on as we are, from crisis to crisis with crisis-remedies and stop-gap action.

I believe there is a chance for a durable peace. I believe it lies in a continuous and perceptive appraisal of the unfolding realities of international life and a determination to deal with these realities with initiative with honesty, with courage, with soberness and with adaptability. This responsibility applies equally to the Administration, the Congress, and the American people.



We must not lose the chance to move towards a more durable peace. We must not lose it, Mr. President, not only because peace is the deepest desire of the people of the United States and the world; we must not lose it because peace is the most urgent need of mankind.